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CASES NOTED
more readily attained. The solution of the problem in the lower schools
is and should be left to time20 and legislative action.
21
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - NOTICE BY
PUBLICATION IN SETTLEMENT OF ACCOUNTS
OF STATUTORY COMMON TRUST FUND
Trustee of common trust fund filed a petition for judicial settlement
of accounts as prescribed in a statute authorizing the establishment of the
common trust fund.1 When the first investment in the fund was made,
the trustee notified each beneficiary by mail. The notice given in this
petition was by publication as set out in the statute.2 The beneficiaries so
served were not all within the jurisdiction of the court. Held, that under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the statutory notice does not afford due pro-
cess of law to those beneficiaries whose place of residence is known, but
is sufficient to those beneficiaries whose whereabouts could not reasonably
be ascertained. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 70 Sup. Ct.
652 (1950).
In the determination of what constitutes due process of law with re-
spect to adequacy of notice under the Fourteenth Amendment, a distinction
is usually drawn between actions in rem and in personam.3 A proceeding
in personam is against the person based on jurisdiction of the person,4 while
a proceeding in rem, against property, involves jurisdiction over the res to
be adjudicated by the court.5 Actions in personarn are further distinguished
from those in rem since, in the latter, a valid judgment is obtained without
personal service of process, while personal service is a condition precedent
to a valid judgment in personam. 6 Proceedings quasi in rem, against a
person in respect to property within the jurisdiction,7 include those actions
to adjudicate interests of persons designated and constructively served as
unknown.8
The adequacy of service by publication depends on whether it is reason-
ably calculated, under the circumstances, to give the necessary parties an
actual knowledge of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. The
20. See 2 BEVERInCE, LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL, 21 (1919) (these "distinctions and
Prejudices exist to be subdued only by the grave.").
21. See Cart v. Corning, 182 F.2d 14, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
1. N.Y. BANKINc LAw § 100-c.
2. N.Y. BANuqNc LAw § 100-c (12).
3. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
4. McCormick v. Blaine, ,245 Ill. 461, 178 N.E. 195 (1931).
5. See Beck v. Otero Irr. Dist., (D. Colo.). 50 F.2d 951, 953 (1931).
6. White v. Glover, 138 App. Div. 797, 123 N.Y. Supp. 482 (1st Dep't 1910).
7. Hill v. Henry, 66 N.J. Eq. 150, 57 Atl. 554 (1904); Gassert v. Strong, 38 Mont.
18, 98 Pac. 497 (1908).
8. 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 1522 (5th ed. 1925).
9. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires appropriate
notice of the pending judicial action. 10 A judgment rendered by a court
has no effect without valid service of process1' which affords such notice.12
In order to adjudicate matters wherein unknown persons arc inv.:ved,
statutes have been enacted authorizing constructive service by publication."8
These statutes contemplate an honest and well directed effort to ascertain
the names and addresses of such persons.' 4 Confined to proceedings in rem
and quasi in rem, these statutes have been upheld. 15 Acknowledging that
such proceedings are unsatisfactory," the courts, of necessit'y, employ them
since a person cannot be bound by a judgment unless he has been afforded
service in some manner.'
7
The beneficiary's right to an accounting follows the existence of a
trust.' A proceeding of this nature, being agair the person with respect
to the res, has been in cases interpreting the .tute here involved, char-
acterized as quasi in rem. 19 This classification , justified by reliance on the
analogous adjudication of the rights of person iutside of a court's juris-
diction with respect to property within the jumsdiction in suits to quiet
title,20 to foreclose mortgages, 2' personal property tax confirmation pro-
ceedings, 2  and garnishment proceedings. 23 However, in the instant case,
the distinctions between actions in personam and in rem have been dis-
pensed with by the Court's assertion that the adequacy of constructive
service is independent of such classification. The Court stresses, not the
power of a state to control trusts established under its law, but the obligation
of a state to give beneficiaries of such trusts appropriate opportunity to
contest adjudication of their personal rights. Notwithstanding the type or
historical classification of a proceeding, a statute prescribing constructive
service on a person who can with proper diligence be served personally, can
never conform with requirements of due process of law.24
The advantageous use of proper distinction between actions in rem
and actions in personam for many facets of the law is not disparaged by
10. State v. Standard Oil Co., 2 N.J. Super. 442, 64 A.2d 386 (1949).
11. Wise v. Herzog, 114 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
12. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914).
13. Mc~lymond v. Noble, 84 Minn. 329, 87 N.W. 838 (1901).
14. Robbins v. Slavin, 292 Ill. App. 479, 11 N.E.2d 651 (1937).
15. See Note, L.R.A. 1918F, 609, 613 (1918).
16. Ibid.
17. Lones v. Fuller, 280 Ky. 671, 134 S.W.2d 240 (1939).
18. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 172 (1935).
19. See In re Security Trust Co. of Rochester, 189 Misc. 748, 70 N.Y.S.2d 260,
273 (Surr. Ct. 1947), rev'd on other grounds, 275 App. Div. 1020, 92 N.Y.S. 2d 308
(4th Dep't 1949); In re Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 274 App. Div. 772, 80
N.Y.S.2d 127, 128 (1st Dept 1948) (dissenting opinion).
20. Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U.S. 261 (1912); McDaniel v. McElvey, 91 Fla. 770,
108 So. 820 (1926); Bear Lake County v. Budge, 9 Idaho 703, 75 Pac. 614 (1904); In
re Bergman's Survivorship, 60 Vyo. 355, 151 P.2d 360 (1944).
21. Bradwell v. Collins, 44 Minn. 97, 46 N.\V. 315 (1890).
22. Barnett v. Cook County, 373 ill. 516, 26 N.E. 862 (1940).
23. Encyclopaedia Brittanica v. Shannon, 133 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
24. lunstock v. Estate Development Co., 22 Cal.2d 205, 126 P.2d 932 (1942).
CASES NOTED
the Court in its analysis of the instant case. They are rightly circumvented,
however, by the Court's holding that the adequacy of constructive service
rests solely on its reasonable probability of giving actual notice. The
trustee, in the instant case, knew the whereabouts of the known beneficiaries.
They were given notice by mail when the trust was established. The in-
convenience, incidental to mailing notice, should not relieve the trustee
of his obligation to give notice where reasonable. Expediency in the ad-
ministration of complex trusts is desirable, but the safeguard of our con-
stitutional guaranty of due process of law should not be disregarded to
achieve this end.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
ACT-NON-COMMUNIST AFFIDAVIT REQUIRED OF
UNION OFFICERS
Noncompliance by the unions with the requirements of § 9(h) of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947' raised the issue of constitution-
ality of the provision. The section establishes, as a condition precedent to
the use of the facilities of the National Labor Relations Board, the filing
of an oath by each official of the labor union that he is not a member of,
or affiliated with, the Communist party and that he does not believe in
the overthrow of the government by force or support any organization that
so believes or teaches. Failure of union officers to supply such affidavits
in one case resulted in dismissal of an action by the union to enjoin an
election in which its name did not appear on the ballot.2 Refusal to comply
with the requirement in another situation prevented enforcement of a Board
order requiring the company involved to bargain on pension matters.3 The
two cases were considered simultaneously by the Court. Held, that § 9(h)
of the Labor Management Relations Act does not unreasonably abridge
individual freedoms and thus is compatible with the Federal Constitution.
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 70 Sup. Ct. 674, rehearing
denied, 70 Sup. Ct. 1017 (1950).
The Act was designed to remove obstructions to the free flow of com-
merce. 4 The power of Congress to protect interstate commerce has been
established. However, the method chosen by the enactment of § 9(h) to
prevent dangerous political strikes necessarily met with objection from those
who found their liberties somewhat lessened thereby. The labor'group was
encouraged to chose officers who would sign the affidavits or it might not
1. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1946), as amended 61 Stat. 146 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (Supp. 1949) (Taft-Hartlcy Act).
2. Wholesale and Warehouse Workers Union Local No. 65 v. Douds, 79 F. Supp.
563 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
3. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948).
4. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
5. Ibid.
